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Abstract
In premium auctions, the highest losing bidder receives a reward from
the seller. This paper studies the private value English premium auc-
tion (EPA) for diﬀerent risk attitudes of bidders. We explicitly derive
the symmetric equilibrium for bidders with CARA utilities and con-
duct an experimental study to test the theoretical predictions. In our
experiment, subjects are sorted into risk-averse and risk loving groups.
We find that revenues in the EPA are significantly higher when bidders
are risk loving rather than risk averse. These results are partly consis-
tent with theory and confirm the general view that bidders’ risk prefer-
ences constitute an important factor that aﬀects bidding behavior and
consequently also the seller’s expected revenue. However, individual
subjects rarely follow the equilibrium strategy and as a result, revenue
in our experiment is lower than in the symmetric equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Premium auctions have been used across Europe to sell houses, land, boats,
machinery, or inventory of insolvent businesses for centuries (Goeree and
Oﬀerman, 2004). As the name already suggests, the distinguishing feature
of premium auctions is a commitment on the part of the seller to pay a
cash reward (premium) to a set of highest losing bidders. The amount of
that premium is determined according to some pre-specified rule. This kind
of tactics is commonly believed to be able to enhance competition and to
induce higher bids. Therefore, even though it appears that the seller is
giving away some of the profits, the final equilibrium payoﬀ to the seller
could still be higher with a premium rather than without one.
Theoretical justifications for such premium tactics remain inconclusive,
however. Existing studies have demonstrated the potential value of premium
auctions in the special case of an asymmetric setting, e.g., when there is
one strong bidder who competes with several weak bidders (e.g., Ayres and
Cramton, 1996; Goeree and Oﬀerman, 2004; Milgrom, 2004; Hu, Oﬀerman,
and Onderstal, 2010).
In a recent paper, Hu, Oﬀerman, and Zou (2011) consider a symmetric
English premium auction (EPA) model. Just as in an English auction (EA),
the auctioneer raises the price in the EPA until all but one bidder have
withdrawn. The remaining bidder wins the object and pays the price at
which the auction ends. Unlike in the EA, the last two remaining bidders
in the EPA receive a premium from the seller that is determined by a pre-
specified function of the diﬀerence between the prices at which the second-
and third-to-last bidders withdraw. Hu et al. (2011) show that the seller’s
expected revenue increases in bidders’ risk tolerance: the more risk loving
they are, the higher revenue.
In this paper, we derive a closed-form solution of the equilibrium bid
function in a classical symmetric, private values setting assuming that bid-
ders exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (Proposition 1). This solution
allows us to quantify the qualitative results of Hu et al. (2011) regarding
the revenue comparison between the EPA and the standard English auction
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(EA). The solution reveals that equilibrium bids for risk loving subjects are
stunningly high for bidders with low values. In fact, if values are distributed
uniformly on [0 100], for the specific parameters used in our experiment,
risk loving bidders should bid more than 80 even if their value is close to 0.
In an EA, bidders should bid their value regardless of risk preference. By
the revenue equivalence theorem, revenues for risk neutral bidders should be
the same for EPA and EA. Hence, revenue for the EPA with risk loving bid-
ders should be higher then for an EA and vice versa for risk averse bidders.
In fact, we show that revenue in a EPA should be about 50% higher than
the corresponding EA for realistic parameters of risk lovingness and about
25% lower for realistic values of risk aversion in our specific setting.
This prediction raises two important empirical issues. The first issue is
the empirical validity of the prediction: Is it true that in practice the more
risk averse (loving) bidders are, the less (more) expected revenue will be
generated through an EPA? The second issue is the extent to which the
premium practice would make a diﬀerence: Is risk preference a suﬃcient
reason for a seller to adopt a premium policy in practice (rather than a
standard English auction, for example)?
In this paper, we investigate these issues through a series of experiments.
A novel aspect of our experiments is that we first sort prospective subjects
into risk averse and risk loving groups in order to ensure that our experiment
is more in line with the model assumption of ex ante symmetric bidders.
This is done using the method proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) in an
online experiment, which takes place several weeks before the main auction
experiment. We then invite each group to separate EPA sessions.
Our results are partly consistent with theory and confirm the general
view that bidders’ risk preferences constitute an important factor that af-
fects bidding behavior and consequently also the seller’s expected revenue.
However, individual subjects rarely follow the equilibrium strategy and as a
result, revenue in our experiment is lower than in the symmetric equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model and theoretical results. Section 4 introduces the experimental design.
In Section 5 we present the experimental results. In Section 6 we conclude.
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Some proofs and the instructions for the experiment are collected in the
appendix.
2 Auction rules and theoretical predictions
In this section we introduce the auction rules and derive theoretical pre-
dictions. Suppose there is a single indivisible object for sale via an English
premium auction (EPA).1 Just like in a standard ascending English auction,
the price in an EPA increases continuously. The last remaining bidder re-
ceives the good and pays the price at which the second-to-last bidder quits
(the sales price). There is one important diﬀerence between the EPA and
an English auction: in an EPA, the last and the second-to-last remaining
bidders both receive a premium from the seller. This premium is a per-
centage of the diﬀerence between the sales price and the price at which the
third-to-last bidder quits. The according percentage is announced before
the auction starts. Ties are resolved randomly.
Suppose there are  ( 2) bidders with private values  that are indepen-
dently distributed ex ante according to a cumulative distribution function
 which has a continuously diﬀerentiable density function  =  0 that is
strictly positive on its support [] ⊂ R+  .
For analytical convenience, we perceive the EPA w.l.o.g. as a two-stage
auction. In the first stage, the price rises continuously from zero and each
bidder stays in the auction until he makes an irrevocable decision to exit.
This stage ends as soon as only two bidders, called finalists, remain. The
price level 3 at which the third-to-last bidder quits is called the bottom
price. This price can be viewed as an endogenously generated reserve price
for the second stage.
In the second stage, the price level rises from 3 until one of the finalists
quits at some 2. The last bidder who stays wins the object and pays the
sales price 2. In addition, both finalists receive a cash premium from the
seller that is equal to (2 − 3) for  ≥ 2. For instance, the seller
may announce to the bidders prior to the auction that he will give back the
1See Goeree and Oﬀerman (2004) and Hu, Oﬀerman, and Zou (2011) for details.
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amount 2−3 to the two finalists and let them have an equal share of it, in
which case  = 2 Another example is where the seller pre-announces that
he will “go Dutch” with the two finalists and equally share with them the
amount 2 − 3, in which case  = 3
In order to obtain tractable equilibrium solutions, we assume that the
bidders have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and that they have
the same utility function parameterized by 
() = 1− exp(−)   ∈ R (1)
where  can be positive (risk averse) or negative (risk loving). If a bidder
quits before entering the second stage, his utility equals (0) = 0 We also
normalize the seller’s reservation value for the object to be zero, so that the
sale will take place with certainty.
We shall focus on symmetric equilibria in which all bidders adopt the
same bidding strategies  and  for stages  and , respectively.2 By
backward induction, the strategy pair (  ) is an EPA symmetric equi-
librium if (i) given any bottom price 3 and updated information, ( 3)
maximizes the expected utility of a finalist with value  provided the other
finalist adopts the same strategy  , and (ii) given the common knowledge
about   all bidders will adopt  in the first stage–that is, a bidder with
value  will quit at the price  = () Hu et al. (2011, Theorems 1 and 2)
show in a more general setting that such a symmetric equilibrium pair exists
and is unique, and that the bid functions (provided they are bounded from
above) are necessarily diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing in the private
signal (or value as in the present context) of the bidders. The analysis of
Hu et al. (2011) implies that in our setting the bid function  is defined
implicitly by () = ( ()) and  is characterized by a diﬀerential
equation with the boundary condition ( 3) ≡ 
Given that we assume CARA utility functions, we can solve explicitly
for the EPA equilibrium bid function. In particular, we show that in this
2 It is known that even in ex ante symmetric settings there may exist multiple asym-
metric equilibria (e.g., Maskin and Riley, 2003). We focus on symmetric equilibria in this
study.
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case, the bid function ( 3) is independent of the bottom price 3 We
also explicitly derive a number of comparative statics results concerning how
the premium and the bidder risk attitudes aﬀect bidding behavior as well
as the seller’s expected revenue.
Given any value vector (1  ) let (1) (2) and (3) denote the
largest, second largest, and third largest value from this vector. Let (  )
be the symmetric EPA equilibrium. Because  is increasing, the first stage
will end with 3 = ((3)) and both finalists will have an updated cumula-
tive probability distribution function
£ ()−  ((3))¤  £1−  ((3))¤ about
the other finalist’s value 
Now fix any bottom price 3 ∈ [). The expected utility of the
finalist who has value  ∈ [(3)] and who bids as though his value were
 ∈ [(3)] equals
( ) = 1
1−  ((3))
Z 
(3)

µ
 − ( 3) + 1(
( 3)− 3)
¶
 ()
+
1−  ()
1−  ((3))
µ
1
(
( 3)− 3)
¶
 (2)
where the first term on the right-hand side results from winning and the
second term from losing (with premium collected).
Proposition 1 Assume that  is given by (1). Then, for arbitrary  ≥ 2
and  ∈ R, the EPA symmetric equilibrium bid functions satisfy () =
( 3) = (), which is given by
() = −1 ln
µZ 

−(|)
¶
 where (|) = 1−
µ
1−  ()
1−  ()
¶

(3)
Proof. See the Appendix.
For the special case with risk neutral bidders, it can be checked by taking
the limit as → 0 that the equilibrium bid function converges to
() =  +
Z 

µ
1−  ()
1−  ()
¶
 (4)
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as shown in Hu et al. (2011). The second term on the right-hand side of
this expression indicates the over-bidding above the true value due to the
premium.
Now let (|) denote the equilibrium bid function associated with
the CARA parameter  and the premium rule  The comparative statics
results of the next proposition follow straightforwardly.
Proposition 2 The EPA equilibrium (|) has the following properties:
(i) (|) decreases in  for all  ≥ 2
(ii) (|) decreases in  for all  ∈ R
Proof. See the Appendix.
3 Parameters used in the experiment
We focus on the special case in which the bidders’ private values are uni-
formly distributed on [0 100] i.e.,  () = 100 with density () = 1100
The result of Proposition 2 (ii) shows that a higher premium results in a
larger expected diﬀerences in average revenues between groups of bidders
with diﬀerent risk preferences. To make this diﬀerence as pronounced as
possible, we use the largest premium rate, i.e.,  = 2
Substituting the assumed parameters into (3) we get
Z 

−(|2)
= −2
µ
1
100− 
¶2µ
−− (100− ) +
Z 100

−
¶
= −2
µ
1
100− 
¶2µ
−− (100− )− 1
³
−100 − −
´¶
= −2
− ( − 100)− 1
¡−100 − −¢
( − 100)2 
Consequently, the equilibrium bid function is given by
() = −1 ln
Ã
−2
− ( − 100)− 1
¡−100 − −¢
( − 100)2
!
 (5)
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Figure 1: Euilibrium bid functions for various risk preferences. Here,  is
assumed to be uniform on [0 100] and  = 2 The risk averse bid function
is plotted for  = 07 and the risk loving bid function for  = −05
The risk neutral case can be derived from (4) for  = 2 and  () =
100, giving
0() = 2
3
 + 100
3

To illustrate, we depict in Figure 1 the equilibrium bid functions of
risk averse, risk neutral, and risk loving bidders. The figure confirms that
the premium, in general, induces the bidders to bid higher than their true
values. It also shows that the bids are uniformly higher (lower) if the bidders
are more risk tolerant (averse). Note that the diﬀerences are particularly
pronounced for small values of .
We now calculate the expected revenues and compare them to that of an
English auction. Let (2)() denote the density of the second-highest value
among the  bidders, and let (2)(3)( ) denote the joint density of the
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second-highest and third-highest values. These functions are given by
(2)() = 10−4(− 1)
³ 
100
´−2
(100− )
(2)(3)( ) = (− 1)(− 2) ()−3(100−  ())()()
= 10−6(− 1)(− 2)
³ 
100
´−3
(100− ) for   ,  ≥ 3
In an English auction (EA), bidders should bid up to their true values
regardless of risk preferences so that the EA revenue is
() =
Z 100
0
(2)()
= 10−4
Z 100
0
(− 1)
³ 
100
´−2
(100− )
We focus on the case with four bidders. Therefore
(4) = 10−4
Z 100
0
12
³ 
100
´2
(100− ) = 60
The EPA expected revenue is
( )
=
Z 100
0
Z 100

µ
()− 2(()− ())
¶
(2)(3)( )
=
Z 100
0
µ
1− 2
¶
()(100− )(− 1)
µ
1
100
¶
−2 
+
2

Z 100
0
()10−6(− 1)(− 2)
³ 
100
´−3 1
2
( − 100)2 
For  = 2 and  = 4 the EPA revenue function reduces to the expected
bid of the bidder with the third highest value,
2(4 ) = 12 ∗ 10−8
Z 100
0
() ( − 100)2 
The Holt-Laury tests allows to observe -values that range roughly from
−1 to 12 Figure 2 shows the expected revenues of the sellers in the EPA as
a function of  compared to those of the EA (which are constant of course).
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Figure 2: Seller’s expected revenues in the symmetric equilibrium of the
EPA and the EA for the range of -values observed in the experiment.
4 Experimental design
The experiment was conducted in two parts. Part I was an internet exper-
iment designed to elicit subjects’ risk preferences with a Holt-Laury (2002)
questionnaire. Part II was the actual auction experiment conducted in the
laboratory of the University of Heidelberg.
Several weeks before the auction experiment, subjects from the subject
pool of the University of Heidelberg were recruited via the ORSEE online re-
cruiting system (Greiner, 2004) to participate in an online questionnaire with
monetary incentives. In total, 368 subjects participated. All participants
were directed to Charlie Holt’s Vecon website3 and filled in the standard
Holt-Laury questionnaire online (see Appendix for the questionnaire). The
Holt-Laury questionnaire consists of 10 choices between two binary lotter-
ies. By observing a subject’s switching point from the less risky to the more
risky lottery, an interval for the subject’s degree of constant absolute risk
aversion as measured by  can be determined.
3See http://people.virginia.edu/~cah2k/programs.html
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The riskier lottery yielded payoﬀs of either 4.85 or 1.1 euro, payoﬀs in
the safer lottery were 3 or 2.6 euro. We added 1 euro to the standard payoﬀs
to compensate subjects for the eﬀort of picking up their payment in person.
We discarded 48 observations which were either incomplete, inconsistent
(because subjects switched back and forth between columns or because they
did not choose a strictly dominating safe option), or where subjects were
trying to participate multiple times. This left us with 320 subjects.
A few weeks later we invited subjects to the lab grouped by their risk
aversion, i.e. we formed sessions of risk loving and risk averse subjects.4
Thus, the treatment variable was the risk attitude of subjects. In each
auction, four bidders had the opportunity to bid for an object. The number
of auction periods was 15 in all sessions and this was commonly known.
Bidders interacted in fixed groups of four for these 15 periods. Bidders’
valuations were chosen independently (across periods and subjects) from a
uniform distribution on [0 1 2  100]. To improve the comparison across
treatments, these value realizations were drawn ahead of time and the same
set of realizations was used for both our treatments.
The auction experiment was computerized using the z—Tree software
package provided by Fischbacher (2007). Each auction was conducted as
follows. On a first computer screen, subjects were shown their bidder ID,
which was randomly and independently determined anew each round (which
made it impossible to identify other subjects in their group), and their value
for the object. On the second screen (see Figure 3) there were three areas.
On the left area, a rising red bar indicated the current price. The current
price was also shown numerically on the right side in the center. The price
increased with a speed of 2 points per second for prices below 34 and with a
speed of 1 point per second for higher prices. On the upper right side of the
screen, subjects were reminded of their ID and value. On the lower right
side, there was the “exit” button which allowed subject to exit the auction.
The exit prices of other bidders were indicated on the price bar by a black
4 In particular, we classified subjects that chose the safer lottery 7, 8, or 9 times on the
Holt-Laury questionnaire as risk averse and subjects that chose the safe lottery 0-3 times
as risk loving.
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line together with the ID of the bidder.
There was one interesting design issue that requires some elaboration and
which may also be relevant for other experiments. After we had collected
data from three groups for each treatment, we noted that subjects sometimes
seemed to exit the auction as soon as they heard mouse clicks originating
from other subjects. Although the information whether, and at what price,
a bidder had left the auction was also provided visually, we were concerned
that subjects would react to clicks by subjects in a diﬀerent group. To
address this concern, we changed the design in two ways. First, we adjusted
the increments in which prices were increasing from 1 point to 0.1 points
making ties much less likely (keeping the overall speed of the price movement
the same). Second, we employed a new z-Tree feature that triggered the exit
from the auction by moving the mouse pointer into the exit area (hovering)
without clicking a mouse button. However, our results indicate that neither
change appears to aﬀect the exit behavior in a substantial way.5
After each auction period, bidders were informed about the selling price,
whether they obtained the object, the value of the object to them, the
amount of the premium if any, and their profit from this auction.
Instructions (see Appendix B) were written on paper and distributed in
the beginning of each session. When subjects were familiar with the rules,
5To test whether these changes have an eﬀect on how often subjects leave immediately
after some other subject has left the auction, we count the number of auction periods
in which at least two subjects leave within an interval of 0.5 seconds. When the price
increases at 1 point per second, subjects have on average 0.5 seconds to leave the auction
at the same price as a predecessor assuming that the predecessor’s exact time of exit
is randomly determined. Therefore, an interval of length 0.5 seconds allows us to best
compare sessions in which the price increases at increments of 1 to sessions in which the
increment is 0.1.
Out of 30 periods in which mouse clicks could be heard and where the increment was 1,
there were 8 periods in which at least two subjects left the auction within an interval of
0.5 seconds (27%). There were 60 periods in which mouse clicks could also be heard but
the increment was reduced to 0.1 and at least two subjects left within 0.5 seconds of each
other in 25 of these periods (42%). Out of 60 periods in which the increment was also 0.1
and where it was not necessary to click to exit the auction, 25 (42%) satisfy the criterion
that at least two subjects left the auction within 0.5 seconds. Therefore, it does not appear
that reducing the increment leads to a reduction in simultaneous exits. Moreover, whether
subjects hear others click or not does not appear to aﬀect the frequency of simultaneous
exits.
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Figure 3: Screen shot of the bidding stage
they had to answer an extensive set of online test questions. We recorded
the time a subject took to fill in the test questions. As soon as all subjects
had answered all questions correctly, we started the first round.
For both treatments (i.e. risk attitudes) we had five independent groups
of subjects, which yielded a total of 40 (= 2 × 5 × 4) subjects who par-
ticipated in the auction experiment.6 Subjects were paid the sum of their
earnings from 5 randomly selected periods. Points were converted to euro
at a rate of 3:1. Additionally, subjects started with an endowment of 5 euro.
The average payoﬀ was 13.5 euro including the show-up fee.7 Experiments
typically lasted about 45 - 60 minutes including instruction time.
6The number of observations was limited by the diﬃculty of recruiting a suﬃcient
number of risk loving subjects to the lab.
7Except for the first two sessions, we also paid a show-up fee of 3 euro to all subjects
in addition to their other earnings. In one sessions, we increased this show-up fee to 8
euro since we had to restart the software, which lead to some delay.
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Table 1: Mean Revenues
experimental theoretical predictions
treatment EPA EPA EA
risk loving
6070
(2152)
8415
(789)
5803
(2150)
risk averse
4988
(2154)
5452
(2672)
5803
(2150)
Note: Standard deviations based on 75 observations (5 times 15 periods) in parentheses.
All values are calculated based on the same draws of valuations.
5 Experimental results
As a first step we look at the revenues obtained by the seller in the auctions.
Table 1 lists the mean revenues for the experimental EPA separately for the
treatment with risk loving subjects and for risk averse subjects. Average
revenues with risk loving subjects (60.70) are much higher than those for
risk averse subjects (49.88). This diﬀerence is significant based on a MWU-
test ( = 0032 two-sided) based on the average revenues of each group as
one independent observation.
A similar picture emerges when we control for the value of bidders (recall
that the same value realizations were used in both treatments). Table 2
displays an OLS regression (with clustered standard errors) of bids on values,
a dummy for the risk loving treatment, and periods. In addition we included
the time (in seconds) it took subjects to correctly answer the test questions
given the possibility that subjects who took longer would bid diﬀerently
from the rest.
As expected, value is highly significant. There also seems to be a sig-
nificant positive time trend in bids although in absolute numbers it is fairly
small (average bids increase by about 8 points over the experiment). The
time it took a subject to answer the test questions does not have any influ-
ence on his bid. Most relevant for our question is the fact that the dummy
for risk loving subjects is highly significant, which supports the evidence
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Table 2: How are bids determined?
Dependent variable:
exit prices (bids) coeﬃcient std. error
value 0728∗∗∗ 005
dummy for risk loving 7043∗∗∗ 204
seconds to answers test questions −0004 001
period 0583∗∗ 023
constant 14416∗∗∗ 304
2 054
Note: Standard errors are clustered by groups. The number of clusters is 10. The number
of observations is 461, which results because we cannot observe exits prices for subjects
that - as winners - did not exit. In some cases the last bidders exited simultaneously, in
which case we can observe all exit prices. ∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
from the MWU-tests.
Result 1 As predicted by theory, revenues in the EPA are significantly
higher with risk loving bidders than with risk averse bidders.
As theoretical benchmarks, Table 1 also lists the revenues as derived
from the equilibrium bid function (5) above and based on the realizations of
bidders’ values that were actually used in the experiment. As one can see,
the revenues in the experiment fall short of the theoretical prediction for
both treatments but particularly for risk loving bidders. The diﬀerences for
both treatments are significant according to a (paired) Wilcoxon test (both
-values are 0.043, two-sided).
Result 2 The revenues from the EPA are substantially and significantly
lower than predicted by the theoretical bidding function (5).
Finally, Table 1 also lists the revenues that are predicted for a regular
English auction based on the realizations of bidders’ values that were actu-
ally used in the experiment assuming that bidders follow their weakly dom-
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inant strategy.8 Comparing these to the experimental data from the EPA,
we find that revenues are slightly but not significantly higher ( = 050,
two-sided, Wilcoxon test) in the EPA for risk loving subjects and they are
significantly lower ( = 0043 two-sided, Wilcoxon) for risk averse subjects.
Result 3 As predicted by theory, revenues of the EPA for risk averse bid-
ders are significantly lower than (predicted) revenues of an EA. In contrast
to the theoretical prediction, revenues of the EPA for risk loving bidders are
not significantly higher than those predicted for an EA.
We will now turn to individual bidding behavior to find out where and
why the theoretical predictions fail. Figure 4 shows the exit prices of sub-
jects for the diﬀerent values. Also shown are the 45 degree line, which
would correspond to subjects bidding exactly their value, and three diﬀer-
ent equilibrium bidding lines, which result from applying the equilibrium bid
function (5) to the various -values corresponding to the choices from the
Holt-Laury questionnaire.9 In particular, the top panel of Figure 4 shows
exit prices for risk averse bidders, i.e. subjects that chose the safe lottery 7,
8, or 9 times on the Holt-Laury questionnaire. The bottom panel of Figure
4 shows the same for risk loving subjects, i.e. subjects who chose the safe
lottery 0-3 times.
In both treatments, there are some subjects who make the weakly dom-
inated choice of exiting the auction at prices below their value. A large
number of exit prices seems to be fairly close to the value. For risk averse
subjects, this implies that they are also close to the equilibrium predictions.
8 In experiments, bids and revenues for an EA are usually very close to the theoretical
prediction, see e.g. Coppinger et al. (1980); Kagel et al. (1987); and Goeree and Oﬀerman
(2004).
9Recall that an agent’s utility function is given by (1). We define a value for  for each
subject using the following procedure. We observe the subject’s choices in the Holt-Laury
questionnaire. These choices are typically consistent with an entire interval of values for
. We simply use the midpoint of these intervals except when the according interval is
not defined. That is the case when subjects are very risk loving (they always chose the
risky lottery) or when they are very risk averse (they choose the safe lottery 9 times). In
these two cases, we use the least risk loving respectively the least risk averse value for 
that is still consistent with the subject’s choices.
15
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
B
id
0 20 40 60 80 100
Value
Equilibrium Bids 45 Degree Line
Risk Averse
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
B
id
0 20 40 60 80 100
Value
Equilibrium Bids 45 Degree Line
Risk Loving
Figure 4: Scatter plot of bids (i.e. exit prices) of subjects depending on
their values. The diﬀerent equilibrium bidding functions are calculated for
midpoints of the cutoﬀ values for  corresponding to choosing the safe lottery
7 8 or 9 times (top panel) and 0 1 or 2 (bottom panel).
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Figure 5: Scatter plot of exit prices of risk loving subjects, separately for
the first 5 periods, the middle 5 periods, and the final 5 periods.
For risk loving bidders, only few exit prices are close to the equilibrium pre-
diction, which holds in particular for low values. Figure 5 shows the same
as the bottom panel of Figure 4 but split into the first 5 periods, the middle
5 periods, and the final 5 periods. Although there is a slight increase in the
frequency of high bids when values are low, there does not seem to be a
convergence to the equilibrium bid function.
If subjects do not bid according to the equilibrium bidding function,
what do they do instead? Several alternative strategies come to mind. Sub-
jects could simply bid up to their value like in an English auction (we call
this strategy: at_value). A slightly more sophisticated strategy would be
to stay in the auction until the price reaches the value plus the current
premium, where the current premium is simply the diﬀerence between the
current price and the bottom price (value_plus_premium). Although it is
17
Table 3: Classifications of bidding behaviors
Strategy # of cases average profit
all 600 4.34
eq_bid 212 12.42
at_value 301 10.20
below_value 347 9.16
value_plus_premium 266 10.24
after_second 244 2.67
after_first 170 1.27
unclear how such a strategy could be profitable, we also think it possible
that subjects stay in the auction until the second bidder (or the first bidder)
exited (after_second resp. after_first).
Table 3 classifies all bids according to whether they are within 3 points of
the predicted exit price for the above strategies. For example, if value_plus-
_premium predicts that a bidder should exit at 90, then all bids that are
between 87 and 93 are counted as success. The exception is the strategy
below_value which counts all bids that are less than value plus 3 (and
therefore subsumes all cases of at_value). While only 212 of 600 cases can
be classified as being close to equilibrium bids, 301 respectively 347 cases
are classified as at_value and below_value.
Table 3 also lists the average profit of all bids that are consistent with
a particular strategy. While the after_second and after_first strategies
clearly do much worse than the rest, the remaining strategies are fairly close
together. While the equilibrium strategy is the best strategy empirically, the
pressure to abandon a simple strategy like at_value is minor, which could
explain why subjects did not converge to equilibrium behavior.
We can also ask how often the same subject can be classified into one
of the categories of Table 3 out of all his 15 decisions. Figure 6 shows for
each classification a frequency distribution of the number of subjects whose
behaviors are compatible with this particular theory in  out of 15 rounds.
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Figure 6: Frequency distribution of the number of periods for which the
behavior of subjects is compatible with a particular classification.
For example, there are 9 subjects whose behavior is compatible with the
strategy value_plus_premium in 7 of the 15 rounds.
To shed further light on whether bidders follow the equilibrium strategy,
we test whether bids are independent of the bottom price, which they should
be in the symmetric equilibrium with CARA bidders. For that purpose, we
consider bids that are submitted after the bottom price has been established
(i.e., after the third to last bidder dropped out). We run a regression (see
Table 4) in which we explain how much subjects bid using two explana-
tory variables and an intercept: The first explanatory variable is simply the
theoretical prediction given a subjects’ private value and risk preference as
revealed in the first stage of our experiment. The second explanatory vari-
able is the bottom price. We find that the bottom price has a significant
positive eﬀect on bids, both when subjects are risk loving and when they are
risk averse (clustering standard errors by group and running two separate
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Table 4: How are bids determined?
Dependent variable:
exit prices (bids) risk averse risk loving
equilibrium bid
365∗∗∗
(064)
431∗
(173)
bottom price
520∗∗∗
(082)
703∗∗∗
(092)
constant
1488∗∗
(332)
−1037
(1744)
 74 80
2 083 0.74
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by groups. The number of clusters is
5. We only use bids that were submitted after the bottom price had been established. The
number of observations is not the same for the two treatments because subjects sometimes
quit simultaneously. ∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
regressions for risk loving and risk averse subjects). One possible explana-
tion for this observation is that a number of subjects follow the strategy we
labeled after_second: They keep bidding until the third-to-last bidder left
and then quit shortly afterwards.
Result 4 Individual bidding behavior in the EPA is diverse. Many subjects
seem to simply bid their value, possibly adjusted for the premium. Others
seem to bid in accordance with the equilibrium bidding strategy. Some bidders
seem to follow heuristics like leaving the auction as soon as one or two other
bidders have left the auction.
Given that most subjects’ behavior is not consistent with any of the
strategies discussed above for all 15 periods (see Figure 6), it would be
natural to consider a dynamic model to explain the data. One possible
approach is learning direction theory (Selten and Stöcker, 1986). The idea
is simply that subjects reflect on whether their expected payoﬀ would have
been higher or lower had they submitted a higher or lower bid. If submitting
a higher bid in the last period would have resulted in a higher payoﬀ, they
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are likely to bid more aggressively in the following period and vice versa. In
our experiment, it is often impossible for a bidder to establish the eﬀect of a
higher bid on his payoﬀ in the previous round. However, there are situations
where at least the sign if not the magnitude of the eﬀect of a higher bid on
a bidder’s payoﬀ can be established.
Consider a bidder who wins the auction and whose value is strictly lower
than the sales price. Such a bidder can only gain by decreasing his bid by
one increment. In the worst case, his profit remains unchanged but it might
also increase by an increment.10 On the other hand, bidding even more
aggressively in this situation would not change such a bidder’s profits for
sure. Therefore, we would expect winning bidders whose values are strictly
lower than the sales price to bid less aggressively in the subsequent period.
When a losing bidder’s value is strictly higher than the sales price, sub-
mitting a slightly higher bid can only lead to a higher or equal profit while
decreasing the bid by one increment would lead to lower or equal profits.11
Therefore, we would expect such a bidder to bid more aggressively in the
subsequent period.
When a winning bidder’s value is higher than the sales price, the bidder
cannot possibly obtain a higher profit by adjusting his bid. When a bidder’s
value is lower than the sales price and the bidder is not winning the auction,
10We can distinguish 2 possible consequences of decreasing one’s bid by one increment
in that situation: (i) The bidder still wins the auction at the same price. As a result,
his profit remains unchanged. (ii) The bidder no longer wins the auction. In that case,
his profit strictly increases: He saves one increment because he no longer has to purchase
the good at a price that exceeds his value. On the other hand, he might lose up to
half an increment because he might now receive a lower premium or no premium at all.
The premium can at most decrease by half an increment because the sales price can at
most decrease by one increment. If the bidder no longer receives the premium at all,
the premium must have been either zero or one increment. Otherwise, it is not possible
that a previously winning bidder loses the premium due to reducing his bid by only one
increment.
11 If such a bidder increases his bid by one increment, his profit increases if he receives a
strictly positive premium (irrespective of whether he already received it before increasing
his bid). It increases even more strongly if in addition, the bidder wins the auction. On
the other hand, decreasing his bid by an increment can lead to a strictly lower profit if
the bidder received a strictly positive premium and he either loses that premium due to
submitting a lower bid or the premium decreases because his bid determined the sales
price. If the bidder did not receive a strictly positive premium, decreasing his bid will lead
to the same zero profit.
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it is unclear whether a higher bid would have resulted in higher or lower
profits: If the higher bid had been suﬃcient for the bidder to win the auction,
profits would have been lower. If, on the other hand, increasing the bid had
resulted in the bidder receiving the premium but not winning the auction,
it would have been a good idea to bid more aggressively.
We therefore only obtain a clear prediction for the case when a bidder
whose value is lower than the sales price wins the auction (bid less aggres-
sively) and for the case when a bidder whose value is higher than the sales
price does not win the auction (bid more aggressively). To test whether
these predictions are borne out in the data, we need to define what we mean
by “bidding more aggressively”: We use the model described in Table 2 to
generate predicted bids and then simply compare actual bids to these pre-
dictions. When the diﬀerence between the prediction and the actual bid
increases in the next period, we say that the according subject is bidding
more aggressively. Table 5 summarizes these results. When a winning bid-
ders’ value is lower than the sales price, the according bidder indeed bids
less aggressively in the subsequent period in 6 out of 7 instances (Table 5,
row 1). When a losing bidder’s value is higher than the sales price, the
bidder bids more aggressively as predicted by learning direction theory in
24 out of 43 cases (Table 5, row 4). Table 5 also indicates the average of
the change of the diﬀerence between prediction and actual bids (Dresidual).
These results suggest that some subjects might indeed try to adjust their
bids in accordance with learning direction theory.
The fact that some subjects simply bid according to their value while
others bid according to the equilibrium bidding function has some further
consequences. In particular in the risk loving treatments, it happened that
bidders with low values bid much higher than bidders with higher values. As
a result, ex-post eﬃciency may suﬀer in the EPA. Table 6 lists three measures
of eﬃciency for both treatments. (1) The share of auctions with a Pareto
optimal outcome, i.e. in which the bidder with the highest value wins. (2)
A measure for the absolute surplus created, the value of the winner divided
by the highest value. And (3), a measure for the relative surplus created,
the diﬀerence between the winner’s value and the lowest value divided by
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Table 5: Learning Direction Theory
% more
obs. Dresidual aggressive
Wins auction & value  sales price 7 −648 1429%
Wins auction & value ≥ sales price 3 −403 3333%
Doesn’t win auction & value ≤ sales price 368 −009 5000%
Doesn’t win auction & value  sales price 43 367 5581%
Note: To obtain the variable Dresidual, we first compute the diﬀerence between the pre-
dicted bid using the model described in Table 2 and actual bids (residuals). We then
subtract the residual of the subsequent period from the residual of the current period
and take the mean over all observations that satisfy the conditions given in column 1 to
obtain Dresidual. If the residual increases, the bidder bids less aggressively and vice versa.
The column % more aggressive indicates the percentage of observations where residuals
decrease.
the diﬀerence of the highest and the lowest value. In an English auction,
all three measures are usually well above 0.95, often above 0.99 (see e.g.
Coppinger et al. 1980 or Goeree and Oﬀerman, 2004). It should be noted,
however, that the EPA may perform well with respect to ex-ante eﬃciency
even though we observe relatively low levels of ex-post eﬃciency (Hu et al.
2012). With respect to ex-post eﬃciency, we can summarize:
Result 5 Compared to the English auction, the EPA yields relatively low
ex-post eﬃciency values in particular for the case of risk loving bidders.
6 Conclusion
This paper reports the results of an experimental study on symmetric private-
value premium auctions. As in most of the auctions literature, we limit our
attention to the case in which the bidders have homogeneous risk prefer-
ences. Assuming constant absolute risk aversion, we derive the symmetric
equilibrium bidding function for an English Premium Auction (EPA) and
show that the seller’s revenue is monotonic in bidders’ degree of risk toler-
ance: the more risk tolerant the bidders are, the higher the seller’s expected
23
Table 6: Eﬃciency measures
treatment
share of auctions won
by highest value bidder
()
(1)
() − (4)
(1) − (4)
risk loving 0.71
089
(024)
085
(032)
risk averse 083 096
(014)
094
(018)
Note: Standard deviations based on 75 observations in parentheses. All values are calcu-
lated based on the same draws of valuations.
revenue.
In order to bring our experimental tests closer to the homogeneous as-
sumption of the model, we first measure the subjects’ risk preferences using
the method developed by Holt and Laury (2002). We then separate the
subjects according to their revealed risk preferences into risk averse and
risk loving groups. A series of experiments are conducted for each group
of subjects separately, and the results confirm that risk loving subjects bid
more aggressively than risk averse subjects. Therefore, our experimental
evidence provides support for the theory that the seller’s revenue is higher
when bidders are risk loving rather than risk averse.
Even though those subjects who follow the equilibrium strategy earn high
payoﬀs in our experiment, most bids are not consistent with the equilibrium
bidding function. We also observe no evidence for convergence towards the
equilibrium. In particular, risk loving subjects bid less than their equilibrium
bids. As a result, the seller’s revenue in the EPA we conducted is lower than
predicted.
When comparing the seller’s revenue in the EPA to the revenue a seller
would presumably have earned in a standard ascending English Auction
(EA), we find that revenue is lower in the EPA than those predicteded for
an EA when bidders are risk-averse, which corresponds to the theoretical
prediction. However, contrary to theory, expected revenue in the EPA does
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not exceed revenue in an EA when bidders are risk loving. Moreover, eﬃ-
ciency in the EPA tends to be lower than in an EA.
Compared to the commonly made assumption that all bidders are risk
neutral, our model is more general in that it allows for various degrees of risk
aversion. Since we find that bidders with diﬀerent risk preferences indeed
bid diﬀerently in the EPA, this generalization can lead to an improvement
of the predictive power of the model. However, we still assume that all
bidders exhibit the same degree of risk aversion. An even more general model
would allow diﬀerent bidders to have diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion.12
Such a heterogeneous model would significantly extend the scope of possible
applications but we have to leave this for future work.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Diﬀerentiating ( ) in (2) with respect to 
and setting the first order condition to 0 at  =  yield
0 =
∙

µ
 − ( 3) + 1(
( 3)− 3)
¶
− 
µ
1
(
( 3)− 3)
¶¸
()
+ (1−  ())0
µ
1
(
( 3)− 3)
¶
1

( 3)
 
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Substituting the functional form (1) of , the above equation simplifies to

 = 
exp(( − ))− 1

()
1−  ()  (6)
Since 3 does not appear explicitly in this diﬀerential equation, ( 3) is
independent of 3 and it therefore can be written as () Rearranging the
terms in (6), and multiplying both sides by exp(−()) we obtain
∙ (1−  ())
 
0() + ()
¸
exp(−()) = () exp(−) (7)
Notice that


µ
1
(1−  ())
 exp(−())
¶
= −
∙
(1−  ())−1() + 1(1−  ())
0()
¸
exp(−())
Hence, (multiplying both sides of (7) by (1− ())−1), (6) is equivalent to
− 
µ
1
(1−  ())
 exp(−())
¶
= (1−  ())−1() exp(−)
Let  be replaced by . Then, integrating the above expression over []
gives
1
(1−  ())
 exp(−()) =
Z 

(1−  ())−1 exp(−) ()
or equivalently, exp(−) = −
Z 

exp(−)
µ
1−  ()
1−  ()
¶
 (8)
It is now easily checked that equation (8) is equivalent to (3), with () ≡
( 3) that is independent of 3.
Finally, since  does not depend on 3 we have () = () as well.¤
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Let 1  2 For  =  we have 1(|) =
2(|) =  To verify this, by L’Hospital’s rule, taking limit of (|)
in (3) as  ↑  yields
lim↑ (|) = −
1
 ln
⎛
⎝lim↑
³
 R  − (1−  ())−1  ()´
(1−  ())
⎞
⎠
= −1 ln
∙
lim↑ 
−
¸
= 
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Let ∆() := 1(|)− 2(|) and suppose hypothetically that there
exists a  ∈ [) such that ∆() ≤ 0. From (6) we have
∆
 = 
()
1−  ()
µ
exp(1(1 − ))− 1
1 −
exp(2(2 − ))− 1
2
¶
≤  ()
1−  ()
µ
exp(1(2 − ))− 1
1 −
exp(2(2 − ))− 1
2
¶
  ()
1−  ()
µ
exp(2(2 − ))− 1
2 −
exp(2(2 − ))− 1
2
¶
(9)
= 0
where the weak inequality follows from the assumption ∆() ≤ 0 and the
strict inequality follows from the general property that


exp()− 1
 =

2
¡− − (1− )¢  0 ∀ 6= 0
Since ∆() = 0 and ∆ is diﬀerentiable, the inequality in (9) contradicts
∆() ≤ 0. So we must have ∆()  0 or that 1(|)  2(|) for all
  .
(ii) Let 1  2 The cumulative distribution function (|) de-
fined in (3) is an increasing function of  Therefore, (|1) dominates
(|2) in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. If   0 the
integrand − is a decreasing function of  and therefore the integral in
(3) increases in  Because − 1  0 this implies (|1)  (|2) If
  0 the integral in (3) decreases in . But then by − 1  0 again we have
(|1)  (|2) For the case with  = 0 the property can be verified
directly from (4).
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Appendix B: Instructions 
 
These are the translations of the original instructions, which were in German. 
The originals are available upon request from the authors. 
Introduction 
Welcome to the AWI Lab. In today’s experiment, you will participate in 15 auctions. The experiment will 
take about one hour, and at the end of the experiment, you will be paid in cash. The payment you 
receive for the experiment depends on your own decisions, the decisions of the other participants, and 
on chance. 
You can make all your choices at your computer. Please do not talk to other participants. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand, and someone will come over. 
Before we start the experiment, you are required to answer a few test questions correctly to make sure 
that you have understood the instructions. Now please read the instructions carefully. You may use 
paper and pencil and take notes any time. 
Instructions 
Groups 
Before the experiment starts, all participants are divided into groups of four. These groups remain 
unchanged throughout the experiment. You will interact only with the members of your group, but not 
with the members of other groups. 
What is the value of a good for an individual bidder? 
The experiment consists of 15 auctions. In each group at each auction a good is sold to one of the 4 
bidders. Prior to each one of the 15 auctions, a value for the good is determined randomly for each 
bidder. This value is an integer between 0 and 100. The value is randomly generated by the computer, 
and  each integer is selected with the same probability. 
The value is determined independently for each bidder. The values of other bidders have no effect on 
the value determined for you. The value for each of the 15 auctions is also determined independently. 
The values in other auctions have no effect on the values determined in the current auction. Therefore 
your values for the good are most likely different from the values of other bidders in your group. 
Additionally, you most likely do not have the same value for all 15 auctions. 
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Each bidder knows his/her own value, but not the values of other bidders. 
Screen 1: Value and Bidder ID 
Prior to each of the 15 auctions, you will be shown your value for 5 seconds. You will see the screen 
shown in Figure 1. This screen also shows your Bidder ID. This ID serves as an identification of the 
different bidders within a group. Your Bidder ID is randomly determined for each of the 15 auctions. 
Therefore you and any other participant are unlikely to be assigned the same Bidder ID each time.  
Figure 1: Screen 1:  
 
{Translation: Auction No. 1 
Your bidder ID:   A 
Your value:  80} 
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Auction procedure 
At the start of each auction, the price of a good is 0. Every 0.5 seconds, the price is raised by one point. 
Once the price has reached 34 points, the price will be raised only every second by one point.   
You can decide to drop out of the auction any time by moving the cursor onto the blue rectangle at the 
right bottom on your screen (see Figure 2). Clicking the mouse is not required. Once you have moved the 
cursor onto the blue rectangle, you drop out of the auction. 
Once 3 or 4 bidders of your group have dropped out, the auction is finished. The bidder who did not drop 
out purchases the good at the current price. If several bidders drop out simultaneously as last bidders in 
an auction, the buyer will be determined randomly: all of the bidders dropped out last have the same 
chance to buy the good at the current price. 
Please look at Figure 2. On the left part of your screen, the red bar shows the current price. You can also 
see when another bidder of your group drops out of the auction. In Figure 2, for example, bidder B 
dropped out at price 20. The right part of the screen shows your Bidder ID, your value, and the current 
price (in a red field).  
Figure 2: Screen 2 
 
{Translation:  Auction No. 1,  Your Bidder ID: A, Your Value:   80,  Current  price: 30.0 
Bidder B, “Please move the mouse pointer to the blue rectangle to leave the auction”} 
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End of Auction 
When you move the cursor onto the blue rectangle, you will be notified that you have dropped out of 
the auction. Figure 3, for example, shows that bidder C dropped out at price 40. When 3 or more bidders 
of your group have dropped out, the auction is finished. 
When the current price has reached 150 points, the auction is finished, even if fewer than 3 bidders have 
dropped out of the auction. The good will be sold at a price of 150 points to one of the remaining 
bidders, with the same probability for each bidder.  
Figure 3:  Screen 3 
 
{Translation:  Auction No. 1, Your Bidder ID: C, Your Value:  40,  “You have left the auction.”  Current 
Price: 41.0. Bidder B, Bidder C, “Please move the mouse pointer to the blue rectangle to leave the 
auction”} 
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Calculating your profit 
The bidder who buys the good receives a profit equal to the difference between the value of the good 
and the sales price. Additionally the buyer and the bidder who dropped out third (that is, the next to last 
remaining bidder) receive a bonus. This means you can make a profit in this auction even if you do not 
buy the good. 
For calculating this bonus, two prices are relevant: the sales prices and the so-called basis price. The 
basis price is the price at which the second bidder drops out. Assume, for example, that bidder B drops 
out at price 20. Then bidder C drops out at price 40. So in this example the basis price is 40. The basis 
price is indicated by a thick blue line (see Figure 4). 
The bonus equals half the difference between sales price and basis price, and is therefore always 
positive. Example: Bidder B drops out at price 20. Bidder C drops out at price 40. The basis price is 
therefore 40. Bidder D drops out at price 50. So the sales price is 50. In this case the bonus is 5: (sales 
price 50 – basis price 40)/2. Bidders B and C receive a profit of 0. Bidder D dropped out third and receives 
a profit of 5 (the bonus). Bidder A purchases the good. His/her profit equals the difference between the 
sales price of 50 and the value of the good plus the bonus of 5. 
Figure 4: Screen 4 
 
Your profit for each auction is calculated as follows: 
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- If you drop out first or second: 0 
- If you drop out third: bonus = (sales price – basis price)/2 
- If you purchase the good: your value – sales price + bonus 
We consider another example: Assume that bidder A drops out at price 20. Bidders B and C drop out 
simultaneously at price 30. Since only one bidder stays, the auction ends, and bidder D buys the good at 
price 30. As the second bidder dropped out at price 30, the basis price is 30. So in this case the bonus is 
0. Bidders A, B, and C gain a profit of 0, and bidder D gains a profit equaling the difference between his 
value of the good and the sales price 30. 
We consider a final example to illustrate the calculation of profits. Assume that the values of bidders A – 
D are allocated in the following manner: 
- Bidder A: 10 
- Bidder B: 30 
- Bidder C: 50 
- Bidder D: 70 
We assume that bidders A - D will drop out at the following prices: 
- Bidder A: 15 
- Bidder B: 50 
- Bidder C: 80 
- Bidder D: 80 
The good is purchased at sales price 80 by bidder 3 or bidder 4, with equal probabilities. Since the second 
bidder dropped out at price 50, the basis price is 50. Therefore the bonus is 15 (sales price 80  – basis 
price 50)/2. The two last remaining bidders, that is, bidders C and D, receive a bonus of 15 each. 
Now we look at the profit of bidder C. If bidder C buys the good, he/she pays the sales price of 80 for the 
good. He/she gets a value of 50 plus the bonus of 15, thus suffering a loss of 15 (value 50 – sales price 80 
+ bonus 15 = profit -15). As bidders C and D dropped out at price 80, each of them buys the good with a 
probability of 0.5.  If bidder D buys the good, the profit of bidder C is 15: He/she only gets the bonus. 
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Display of Profits 
At the end of the auction, the results of the auction are displayed for 15 seconds (see Figure 5). At the 
top you can see the sales price and the bonus. Next, in the middle of the screen,  you learn whether you 
have purchased the good and whether you received the bonus. If you have purchased the good or 
received the bonus, this information is printed blue. It is printed black if you have not purchased the 
good or not received the bonus.  
In the bottom part of the screen your profits are presented in detail. If you have purchased the good, the 
difference between your value and the sales price is displayed. If you did not purchase the good, the 
entry is left blank. Next, your bonus is displayed. If you have not received a bonus, the value is 0.  Your 
profit of the auction equals the sum of the two positions (value – sales price + your bonus). 
Now look at the example in Figure 5. In this auction the sales price is 60, and the bonus is 10. The bidder 
has bought the good, and he/she gets the bonus. So his/her profit is 30. 
Figure5: Screen 5 
 
{Translation: 
Sales Price:   60.0 points 
Bonus:    10.0 points 
You have purchased the good at the sales price. 
You have received the bonus! 
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Your Value – Sales Price: 80.0 – 60.0 = 20.0 points 
Your Bonus                            10.0 points 
 
Your profit in this auction:  30.0 points} 
In the example in Figure 6 the bidder has not purchased the good, nor received a bonus. So his/her profit 
is 0. 
Figure 6: Screen 6 
 
{Translation: 
Sales Price:   60.0 points 
Bonus:    10.0 points 
You have not purchased the good. 
You have not received the bonus. 
Your Bonus     0.0 points 
 
Your profit in this auction:  0.0 points} 
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Payment 
At the end of the experiment 5 out of 15 auctions will be randomly selected. This is done by one of the 
participants randomly drawing without replacement 5 out of 15 balls, each marked with a number. Only 
the profits you gained in the 5 selected auctions will be paid. For 3 points you receive a payment of 1 
euro. Additionally, you receive 5 euros. Your payment is calculated as follows: 
Payment = Your profits gained in the 5 selected auctions / 3  
+ 5 euros 
You will receive your payment in cash at the end of the experiment. Each participant will only learn 
his/her own payment. 
 
 
Test questions 
Now you should be able to answer the test questions. Please raise your hand if you need help. 
Summary 
- The experiment consists of 15 auctions 
- In each auction one good is sold to 1 of 4 bidders of your group 
- You stay in the same group throughout  the 15 auctions 
- For each bidder and each of the 15 auctions, a value between 0 and 100 is selected randomly 
- The price of a good is 0 at the beginning of the auction, and it is raised at regular intervals 
- You can decide to drop out anytime by moving the cursor onto the blue rectangle 
- When 3 or more of the 4 bidders have dropped out of your group, the auction is finished 
- The bidder who did not drop out buys the good at the current price 
- The basis price is the price at which the second bidder drops out 
- Your profit in an auction is: 
o If you drop out first or second: 0 
o If you drop out third: bonus =(sales price – basis price)/2 
o If you buy the good: Your personal value – sales price + bonus 
- At the end of the experiment, 5 auctions will be randomly selected 
- Your payment is: 
Your profits gained in the 5 selected auctions / 3 
+ 5 euros 
 
